How the Trust Wallet Browser Extension Drained Assets – Step by Step Explanation

The Sequence of the Security Incident: From Installation to Theft

December 2024 marked a turning point for browser wallet security. A seemingly legitimate update for the Trust Wallet browser extension contained hidden logic that systematically drained user accounts – millions of dollars in minutes.

Phase 1: The Suspicious Update

On December 24, a new release of the extension appeared. On the surface, it looked harmless:

• No security warnings in the release notes
• Standard update process
• Users installed it as usual

The deception was successful. No one immediately noticed that this was not an ordinary maintenance update.

Phase 2: Hidden Code Changes in a JavaScript File

Security researchers analyzing the extension files discovered new logic in 4482.js. This was the first warning sign. In a wallet extension, every new outgoing communication should be under extreme scrutiny – here, a wall had been broken through.

Phase 3: Masquerading as Legitimate Analytics Code

The malicious logic was cleverly disguised:

• It looked like standard telemetry code
• It did not activate constantly
• It only ran under certain conditions

This design significantly hampered detection. Simple tests might not have uncovered the suspicious code.

Phase 4: The Critical Trigger – Seed Phrase Import

Reverse-engineering analyses suggest that the logic triggered precisely when a user imported a seed phrase into the extension. That was the perfect moment for attackers – because:

• A seed phrase grants full wallet control
• It is usually a one-time process
• Criminals only need to act once

Users who only used existing wallets might have bypassed this trigger.

Phase 5: Data Exfiltration to a Fake Domain

When the condition was met, the code allegedly sent wallet data to an external server:

metrics-trustwallet[.]com

The deception was perfect:

• The domain name resembled a real Trust Wallet subdomain
• It was registered days earlier
• It was not publicly documented anywhere
• It went offline shortly thereafter

Phase 6: Automated Money Theft

Shortly after users imported seed phrases, thousands of wallets were reported drained:

• Transactions occurred within minutes
• Multiple assets were moved simultaneously
• No human interaction was needed

On-chain data showed automated patterns – attackers had enough control to sign transactions independently.

Phase 7: Consolidation via Multiple Wallets

The stolen funds flowed through dozens of attacker accounts. This was no coincidence:

• Multiple target addresses reduce tracking risks
• Automated scripting was obvious
• The behavior matches professional exploits

Total estimates based on tracked transactions: several million dollars.

Phase 8: Rapid Cover-up

After the community raised alarms:

• The suspicious domain was shut down
• No public statement was issued immediately
• Screenshots and cached evidence were critically examined

This is classic attacker behavior: destroy infrastructure once compromised.

Phase 9: Delayed Official Confirmation

Trust Wallet finally confirmed:

• A security incident affected specific extension versions
• Mobile users were not impacted
• An immediate update or deactivation was recommended

However, questions remained:

• Why did the domain exist?
• Were seed phrases exposed?
• Were internal or external actors involved?

These gaps fueled speculation.

What We Know for Sure

✓ A browser extension update introduced suspicious outgoing connections ✓ Users lost funds immediately after importing seed phrases ✓ The incident was limited to certain versions ✓ Trust Wallet confirmed the security breach

What Strong Indicators Suggest

→ Malicious code injection in the supply chain → Seed phrases or signing capabilities were compromised → Analysis code was misused as a weapon

What Remains Unclear

? Whether the code was intentionally inserted or upstream compromised ? Exact number of affected users ? Identity of the attackers ? Whether additional sensitive data was exfiltrated

Why This Incident Affects the Entire Industry

This incident was not a standard phishing attack. It demonstrates:

The fragility of browser extensions – They have access to private keys and seed phrases. A small code flaw or vulnerability can be catastrophic.

The risk of blind trust in updates – Users install updates automatically without reviewing the code. Updates are a perfect attack vector.

How analysis code can be perverted – Telemetry functions appear legitimate but can divert access to sensitive data.

The most critical moment: seed phrase management – Importing a seed phrase is the most dangerous moment in wallet usage.

A brief bug or a deliberately placed vulnerability is enough to steal millions – in minutes.

The lesson: In crypto security, there are no small details. Every update warrants caution, not trust.