Revenue of 80.2 billion, net profit up 15%. Why do Anta make people feel both scared and worried?

Why is AI · Anta’s main brand growth far lower than other brands?

On March 25, Anta Group released its 2025 financial results. Revenue was 80.219 billion yuan, up 13.3%. Fourth consecutive year as the No. 1 in the China market, and in the global top three. Together with Amarfyn (Yamafan), total revenue exceeds 127.8 billion yuan.

But when you look at the 2024 figures, the issue becomes clear: in 2024, Anta’s revenue growth was more than 20%, but in 2025 it dropped to 13.3%. As the company gets bigger, growth becomes harder—that’s normal. What’s truly worth thinking about is that net profit actually grew even faster. Operating profit increased year over year by 15%, nearly two percentage points higher than the revenue growth rate. This indicates Anta is not stacking performance by opening stores relentlessly; instead, operational efficiency is improving. In 2025, free cash flow inflow was 16.106 billion yuan, with net cash of 31.719 billion yuan on hand. There’s plenty of money, and where to spend it is handled with more care.

By brand: FILA revenue was 28.469 billion yuan, up 6.9%. With this scale, growth is still possible, but that’s already not easy. What’s really alarming is the “other brands”—Desente, Kae long (Kelong), and others. Their revenue was 16.996 billion yuan, surging 59.2% year over year, while the number of stores basically didn’t increase much. Desente’s sales for the first time surpassed 10 billion yuan, making it Anta’s third “billion-yuan” brand.

This creates a contradiction: if it’s so capable, why did the revenue growth rate slow down instead? The problem lies with Anta’s main brand. Anta brand revenue was 34.754 billion yuan, up only 3.7%. This growth rate is about 10 percentage points lower than the group overall. The main Anta brand makes up the bulk, but its growth is weak, which directly drags the entire plate down.

Even more worth examining is operating profit margin. The group’s overall operating profit margin was 23.8%, up 0.4 percentage points year over year. But when broken down: Anta’s main brand operating profit margin was 20.7%, FILA was 26.1%, and other brands were as high as 27.9%. Anta’s main brand has the lowest profit margin—this also explains why the group is pushing multiple brands so aggressively. The main brand is indeed getting old and needs a new growth engine.

The multi-brand strategy looks great, but the cost is not small either. R&D spending rose from 350 million yuan in 2016 to 2.2 billion yuan in 2025—five times in 10 years. In 2025, it also released the first design large model in the sports industry. PG7 running shoes sold 4 million pairs annually, and the “C family” professional running shoes sold 1.2 million pairs. Product strength has clearly improved, but whether it can translate into the main brand’s growth rate still remains to be seen. Another set of data is also interesting. Anta opened a number of stores in 2025, but the ones truly driving performance are the higher-end lines—competitive sports, champion-model items, and artistic-ambience stores. This suggests consumers really are willing to pay for professional and design. But for Anta—this “old brand”—recognition may not have fully turned the corner yet.

The most core contradiction is this: Anta’s main brand growth is only 3.7%, while other brands are growing at nearly 60%. This “hot outside, cold inside” situation may be fine in the short term if multi-brand efforts prop it up, but what about the long term? Anta is indeed strong right now, but it may be a bit lopsided.