Sanae Takashi departs for the United States, carrying a trump card with her, ready to turn the tide in one move.

(Source: Times New Journey)

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi boarded a special plane to Washington on March 18. Before departing, both Japan and the U.S. hinted at jointly developing rare earth elements near Minami-Torishima. Some people on the island began to feel excited, thinking that Japan had finally presented something that could compete with the mainland. But is this really that simple? Is this so-called “trump card” in Japan’s hand a tool for a comeback, or just a facade to scare others?

During Takaichi’s visit to the U.S., the focus was on the rare earth issue. According to Japanese media, the two leaders are set to confirm the joint development of rare earth resources near Minami-Torishima on the 19th and will establish a working group to promote this matter. Upon hearing this news, some on the other side were ecstatic, believing that Japan had finally found a shortcut to break free from reliance on the mainland.

Let’s first take a look at Japan’s current situation. Data from Japan’s Metal Energy Security Agency shows that in 2024, 71.9% of Japan’s imported rare earths will come from China. When it comes to heavy rare earths, Japan’s dependence on China is as high as 100%. Elements such as dysprosium and terbium are essential for electric vehicle motors and military products. After China implemented export controls on Japan last year, the vulnerability of the Japanese economy was completely exposed. Hence, Takaichi is eager to bring the U.S. on board to initiate domestic mining at Minami-Torishima; logically, it makes sense. But the question is, can this so-called “trump card” actually be played?

First, let’s talk about technology. Where is Minami-Torishima? It’s over 1,900 kilometers southeast of Tokyo, with rare earth mud lying 5,600 meters deep on the seabed. What does 5,600 meters mean? It would take stacking several Tokyo Towers and dropping them to reach the seabed; extracting mud from such depths with remote-operated suction pipes and mining machines presents extremely high technical challenges. The Nikkei newspaper itself admits that deep-sea remote operations are still a problem, and complex operations involving heavy objects on the deep seabed have not been fully mastered.

Next is the cost. Japan has calculated that the cost of extracting rare earths at Minami-Torishima is conservatively several times to tens of times higher than in China. When not in scale, it costs $100 per kilogram, and in extreme cases, it can exceed $150. When adding in the operational costs of exploration vessels, this equation simply doesn’t add up.

Even more critical is the industrial chain. The reason rare earths have become a strategic weapon for China is not only because of abundant reserves but also due to the full industrial chain advantage from mining to separation and purification. Does Japan have this technology? No. A February article from the UK’s top think tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, pointed out clearly that China’s rare earths can maintain a 90% market share in Japan long-term for one core reason: “Chinese rare earths are much cheaper than those recycled domestically in Japan.” Even if Japan manages to extract the mud, how will it separate and purify it at low cost and high efficiency? They have yet to overcome this hurdle.

Japan plans to conduct formal extraction experiments by 2027, making large-scale commercialization a distant prospect. Therefore, Takaichi’s card is less of an economic trump card and more of a political propaganda tool. It’s something to show the domestic public: “We are finding ways to reduce dependence on China.” It’s also something to show the Americans: “We still have utilization value.” That’s all there is to it.

Why is Takaichi so eager to rush to the U.S.? Besides rare earths, there’s an even more pressing issue—energy. Over 90% of Japan’s energy comes from the Middle East, and the situation there has recently become tense, with ongoing turmoil in the Strait of Hormuz, leading to an urgent energy supply crisis for Japan.

Data doesn’t lie; the turnover inventory for Japanese electricity and gas companies is down to just a few days, and the total inventory of natural gas barely lasts 21 days. Japan relies on natural gas for 30% of its electricity generation. What will happen in three weeks? Power plants will shut down, forced power restrictions will be implemented, and high-energy-consuming industries will come to a halt. Toyota has already started production cuts, and Nissan and Mazda are under pressure across the board. The automotive industry is the heart of Japan’s manufacturing sector; if the heart is about to stop, can the Japanese economy endure?

Moreover, there’s the issue of oil prices. For every $10 increase in international oil prices, Japan’s GDP drops by about 0.3%, resulting in an additional ¥1.3 trillion in import costs annually. With inflation out of control, soaring prices, yen depreciation, and exploding trade deficits, this is not a simple economic downturn but a systemic crisis. Japan is seeking urgent natural gas supplies from the U.S. Can they achieve results? It would be surprising if they don’t get extorted in the process. The logic of the Trump administration is clear: America first. How much are allies worth? Japan signed a security treaty with the U.S., paying a significant amount for the stationed U.S. troops, and at a critical moment, if the U.S. doesn’t come to the rescue, it wouldn’t be surprising if they were dealt a blow as well.

This is Japan’s reality. Without energy, without fertilizers, without rare earths, what can Japan use to contend with China in the long term? Takaichi’s rhetoric of a “resilient Japan” is just that—a rhetoric. Japan’s lifeline is right there: if a maritime energy line is choked off, the entire country suffocates. The so-called economic powerhouse is, at its core, a resource colony.

During this visit to the U.S., Takaichi will not only address rare earth development but will also discuss exchange rates and energy security with the U.S. Japan’s thinking is straightforward: through absolute coordination with the U.S. on military security, they hope to gain support from the U.S. for energy supply and exchange rate stability. But can this calculation bear fruit?

First, regarding rare earths, the envisioned cooperation between Japan and the U.S. for developing Minami-Torishima is for Japan to provide technology while the U.S. provides funding, with the processed products sold back to the U.S. It sounds good, but on what basis will the U.S. invest money? Such high-cost projects have long investment return periods and bleak commercialization prospects; American capital isn’t in the business of charity. Even if the U.S. does invest, Japan’s so-called “technological advantage” is unreliable: deep-sea mining technology is still in the experimental stage, and separation and purification technology is even more of a shortcoming. Researcher Yang Fan has pointed out directly that Japan’s current separation processes fall short of international advanced levels; in terms of supply, cost, and quality, they will not be able to meet their own demands for a long time.

Next, regarding energy, Japan wants to secure stable liquefied natural gas supplies from the U.S., but the U.S. can’t even control its own inflation; how could it give Japan special treatment? Moreover, Trump’s stance towards China is also undergoing subtle adjustments. The White House halted a $13 billion arms sale to Taiwan to ensure his smooth visit to China. What does this indicate? It shows that Japan’s priority in America’s global strategy is not that high; when they need you, you’re an ally, and when they don’t need you, you’re just a pawn. Now that Japan’s energy lifeline is choked and its economy is on the brink, how much utilization value does it still have in the eyes of the U.S.?

Japan’s situation is awkward. Confronting China leaves its economic and energy lifelines choked; relying on the U.S. for rescue sees them completely unresponsive. What can Takaichi bring back from the U.S. with her so-called “trump card”? Most likely, just a few empty platitudes and a cooperation memorandum with little actual content.

Takaichi’s trip to the U.S. is less about breaking the deadlock and more about seeking help. The rare earth card in her hand looks impressive but is essentially powerless. Extracting mud from 6,000 meters deep at an outrageous cost, facing numerous technical bottlenecks, and with a blank industrial chain, the U.S. support is also unreliable, and they won’t hesitate to strike when necessary. After all the turmoil, Japan still has to confront the reality it least wants to face: as long as China holds the rare earth industrial chain and the energy lifeline is controlled by others, Japan lacks the capital to challenge China. A trump card? It’s likely just a pie drawn on paper.

Some materials sourced from: Observer Network, Lunan Broadcasting, Tianjin Daily, Shangguan News, China Electric Power News

Massive information and precise interpretation can be found in the Sina Finance APP.