Funding targets not met, multiple bank wealth management products fail to launch! Industry insiders: products need to break free from the "same old" predicament

By Daily Economic News reporter | Pan Ting Li Yuwun
By Daily Economic News editor | Yang Yi

Recently, multiple wealth-management firms, including Huaxia Wealth Management, Pudong Bank Wealth Management, and CMB Wealth Management, have issued announcements stating that newly issued wealth-management products will not be established. The main reason is that the total fund-raising amount did not meet the minimum threshold. According to incomplete statistics from FaXun Wealth Management website, since the beginning of this year (as of now), there have been 40 wealth-management products whose issuance failed, all of which are fixed-income products. Most of their risk levels are R2 (medium-low risk) and even R1 (low risk).

A reporter from The Paper’s Economic Daily noticed that in 2025, the outstanding scale of bank wealth-management products has continued to expand. However, since this year began, newly issued bank wealth-management products have frequently failed to be established due to “not meeting the fund-raising requirement.”

How should wealth-management companies break the situation where products fail to be established because the fund-raising amount does not meet the threshold? Against this backdrop, considering that residents’ risk appetite remains relatively low in the short term, besides low-risk wealth-management products, what other relatively steady “alternatives” are available?

40 wealth-management products fail to be issued

On March 19, Huaxia Wealth Management released an announcement. Huaxia Wealth Management HeXiang Fixed-Income Wealth-Management Product No. 37 was not established because the total fund-raising amount did not reach the minimum issuance scale stipulated in the product prospectus.

According to data from iFinD (Tonghuashun), in March, Huaxia Wealth Management had six products that were not established, namely “Huaxia Wealth Management HeXiang Fixed-Income Wealth-Management Product No. 37,” “Fixed-Income Creditor-Backed Closed-End Wealth-Management Product No. 1317,” “Fixed-Income Pure-Bond Closed-End Wealth-Management Product No. 354,” “Yue An Xin Fixed-Income Pure-Bond Closed-End Wealth-Management Product No. 83,” “Fixed-Income Creditor-Backed Closed-End Wealth-Management Product No. 1381,” and “Fixed-Income Creditor-Backed Closed-End Wealth-Management Product No. 1002.”

According to a reporter’s understanding from FaXun Wealth Management website, all of the above six products are closed-end, net-asset-value-based fixed-income wealth-management products. Their risk levels are mainly medium-low risk, and overall they are relatively steady. In terms of the issuance-scale threshold, many products have a minimum threshold of RMB 50 million, except that “Huaxia Wealth Management Fixed-Income Creditor-Backed Closed-End Wealth-Management Product No. 1381,” whose minimum scale is RMB 5 million.

According to incomplete statistics from FaXun Wealth Management website, since the beginning of this year there have been a total of 40 wealth-management products whose issuance failed, and all of them are fixed-income products.

In fact, besides Huaxia Wealth Management, Pudong Bank Wealth Management, CMB Wealth Management, and others also have wealth-management products whose issuance failed. For example, Pudong Bank Wealth Management stated in an announcement that the company issued Pudong Bank Wealth Management QiAn Yue Company-Specific Wealth-Management Product Series No. 2603 on March 4, 2026. As of the end of the subscription period on March 10, 2026, the product was not established because the total subscription amount did not reach the minimum issuance scale stipulated in the product prospectus. In mid-February, CMB Wealth Management also issued an announcement saying that its Zhao Rui Jia Yue (Tech Growth) Daily Open, 370-Day Holding Period No. 1 Fixed-Income Enhancement Wealth-Management Plan originally had a subscription period from February 6, 2026 to February 10, 2026. Based on the actual fund-raising situation, the plan’s final fund-raising scale did not reach the minimum issuance scale. According to the relevant agreement, it was decided that the wealth-management plan would not be established.

Outstanding scale of bank wealth-management market exceeds RMB 30 trillion

《China Banking Wealth-Management Market Annual Report (2025)》 (hereinafter referred to as the 《Report》) shows that as of the end of 2025, the outstanding scale of the bank wealth-management market was RMB 33.29 trillion, up 11.15% from the beginning of the year. During the whole year, a total of 33,400 newly issued wealth-management products were created, with raised funds of RMB 76.33 trillion. The number of investors holding wealth-management products reached 143 million, up 14.37% from the beginning of the year. In total, investors were given returns of RMB 730.3 billion over the year.

However, in February 2026, the number of newly issued wealth-management products across the whole market fell quarter-on-quarter. According to data from Puyi Standards, in February this year, the whole market newly issued 2,018 wealth-management products, down 522 month-on-month. Among them, there were 397 open-end products, with an average performance benchmark of 1.85%; and 1,621 closed-end products, with an average performance benchmark of 2.35%. In the same period, wealth-management companies newly issued 1,518 products, down 376 quarter-on-quarter, accounting for 75.22% of the total issuance volume in the whole market.

Zeng Gang, chief expert and director of the Shanghai Finance and Development Laboratory, told reporters that issuance failures of wealth-management products may also occur. In a low-interest-rate environment, products that lack clear positioning and differentiated features will continue to face pressure in fund-raising, which is also a normal reflection of survival of the fittest in the market.

Zeng Gang further said that the failure to meet fund-raising targets for wealth-management products mainly has three reasons. First, yields continue to decline, product appeal drops significantly, and investors’ subscription willingness naturally becomes sluggish. Second, wealth-management products are highly homogeneous, making it difficult to form effective demand. The vast majority of failed products are closed-end fixed-income products, whose underlying assets are all bonds and interbank certificates of deposit; investors are not facing differentiated choices but a simple contest of yields, which is inevitably how the market funnels them elsewhere. Third, there is a structural mismatch between supply and demand, and the contradiction has not been resolved for a long time.

In Su Xiarui, a senior research analyst at Suxi Zhiyan, it is believed that products that fail because the fund-raising scale does not reach the minimum threshold share some commonalities. Su Xiarui told reporters that these commonalities include being fixed-income products, having a risk level of medium-low, and being closed-end net-asset-value-based products.

“These fund-raising-failed wealth-management products mainly target steady investors with lower risk appetite. Their core needs are capital preservation and stable returns rather than pursuing high returns. Fund-raising failure is the result of multiple factors layered together from the supply side, the demand side, the channel side, and the external environment. From the supply side, the products are relatively homogeneous; from the demand side, liquidity preferences are rising, but the performance benchmarks of these products are not attractive enough to the market.” Su Xiarui added that the phenomenon of wealth-management product issuance failures may become a norm going forward.

How can wealth-management companies break the deadlock?

So how should wealth-management companies break the situation where products are not established because the fund-raising targets are not met? In Zeng Gang’s view, efforts should be made in three aspects: product reconfiguration, operating logic, and investor trust.

“On the product level, to get out of the ‘same thousand products’ predicament, you must align with investors’ preferences for liquidity and increase the supply of open-end and short holding-period products.” Zeng Gang told reporters from The Paper’s Economic Daily that it is necessary to introduce diverse assets such as equities, gold, and REITs (real estate investment trusts) in an appropriate way, enrich “fixed-income plus” strategies, and make the products truly competitive in a differentiated way. In 2026, the scale of “fixed-income plus” strategy products has grown by more than 70% year-on-year, demonstrating the market’s recognition of this direction.

“Second is the shift in operating logic. Wealth-management products should say goodbye to a scale-driven approach and return to value creation.” Zeng Gang pointed out that if, before product issuance, it is difficult to judge that the fund-raising scale will meet the target, the company should proactively terminate rather than blindly proceed, concentrating resources on building a few high-quality benchmark products. This has more strategic value than barely keeping a product that is not performing well running.

The final step is rebuilding investor trust. “In the net-asset-value era, professional risk communication and transparent information disclosure are key to retaining customers.” In Zeng Gang’s view, only by helping investors truly understand that “low risk does not mean capital preservation,” and establishing a long-term accompaniment mechanism during market turbulence, can companies hold on to scale in a game of existing players and earn a good reputation.

Su Xiarui also offered her views from directions including asset allocation and channel expansion: on the one hand, wealth-management companies can strengthen asset allocation, developing from “fixed-income as the main focus” toward “diversified and balanced” allocation, increasing allocation to equity-type assets; on the other hand, they can also strengthen channel expansion and a full lifecycle wealth-management service system, and promote capital retention and improve customer stickiness by leveraging professional research and investment capabilities and reliable customer companionship.

What other steady “alternatives” are there?

Considering that residents’ risk appetite in the short term remains relatively low, besides low-risk wealth-management products, what other relatively steady “alternatives” are available? In response, reporters found that while they have relatively steady advantages, products such as savings government bonds and dividend insurance also have their own specific features, which is why they are favored by many investors.

● Savings government bonds: flexible to cash out; can be pledged or redeemed early

On March 10, 2026’s first batch of savings government bonds (certificated-based) were issued for sale. On that day, multiple bank branches again saw instances where quotas “sold out in seconds.” Specifically, so far this year, the maximum issue amount for government bonds has been 15 billion yuan, with a 3-year coupon rate of 1.63% per year and a 5-year coupon rate of 1.7%.

If this level of returns were seen a few years ago, it might not have seemed impressive, but with interest rates falling, the current fixed rates for lump-sum savings at major state-owned banks for 3-year and 5-year terms are only 1.25% and 1.3%, respectively. Against this backdrop, savings government bonds offer a stronger advantage in yield.

In addition, another advantage of savings government bonds is that they can be cashed out flexibly, with relatively good liquidity.

According to reporters, when investors need a loan, they can use savings government bonds as collateral and take out a collateral-backed loan at the original purchasing bank. Not only that, savings government bonds can also be redeemed early during the holding period; interest is paid based on the actual holding time and the corresponding tiered interest rates.

● Dividend insurance: “guaranteed base + floating dividend” dual return advantages; suitable for long-term holding

Recently, when reporters visited banks, they found that dividend insurance with a preset interest rate of 1.75% has become a key flagship product promoted by banks. It mainly includes dividend-type annuity insurance and dividend-type whole-life insurance.

Dividend insurance is an insurance policy that provides a guaranteed interest rate. On top of that, the insurance company allocates distributable surplus to the policyholder based on its actual operating situation, forming floating dividends. With the “guaranteed base + floating” dual return advantages, dividend insurance is quite attractive in the current low-interest-rate environment.

According to analysis by the financial team of Guoxin Securities’ Economic Research Institute, dividend insurance shows three layers of appeal in the current market environment. First, its guaranteed interest rate provides a safety cushion similar to deposits, aligning with residents’ strong demand for principal safety. Second, the floating dividend portion is linked to the insurance company’s investment performance; during periods of falling interest rates, insurance funds can obtain potential returns superior to bank deposits through long-term allocation, satisfying residents’ desire for moderate growth in returns. Third, dividend insurance policies typically have longer insurance periods, which helps guide funds into long-term planning and alleviates volatility caused by short-term “fast in, fast out” behavior in financial markets. In addition, some products also offer functions such as policy loans, to a certain extent addressing liquidity needs.

According to reporters, currently, the guaranteed interest rate for dividend insurance is often 1.75%, and the demonstration interest rate after adding the dividend portion can reach above 3%.

● Broker channels: flexible reverse repurchase terms

In addition to wealth-management products sold through bank channels, there are also some relatively steady products available via broker channels, such as Treasury bond reverse repurchase agreements.

A Treasury bond reverse repurchase agreement is, in essence, a short-term loan. In simple terms, investors lend funds through a securities exchange and receive fixed interest earnings, while the borrower provides Treasury bonds as collateral and repays principal and interest at maturity.

Its advantages include the fact that it uses Treasury bonds as collateral and is regulated by the securities exchange. At the same time, the yield on Treasury bond reverse repurchase agreements is generally much higher than the bank deposit interest rate for the same period. Also, the terms are diversified, ranging from 1 day to 182 days, so investors can choose how many days to lend based on the duration their funds are idle.

Typically, around month-end, quarter-end, year-end, and before holidays, funding demand is strong and interest rates tend to rise—making this the golden period for participating in Treasury bond reverse repurchase agreements. It is important to note that Treasury bond reverse repurchase agreements cannot be bought back early mid-term; after maturity, the principal and interest are automatically returned to the investors’ accounts.

Cover image source: Zhu Yu