GF Securities: The Wosh Era Outlook — Three Shifts in the Federal Reserve's Policy Framework

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Source: Guo Lei Macro Tea Time

Chen Jiali, Senior Macro Analyst at Guangfa Securities

Summary

First, on January 30, 2026, Trump announced that he will nominate Wosk to serve as the next Chair of the Federal Reserve, replacing Powell. Powell’s term as Chair will end in May. In his statement, Trump reviewed Wosk’s professional background and claimed that Wosk would become “one of the greatest Fed chairmen in history” (he will go down as one of the great Fed chairmen), and “will never let you down” (he will never let you down). The nomination still needs confirmation through a hearing at the Senate Banking Committee and a full Senate vote.

Second, Wosk’s resume is extremely diverse. He has hands-on experience in Wall Street M&A, White House economic policy work, and crisis response at the Federal Reserve. He previously served as an Executive Director at Morgan Stanley from 1995 to 2002 in charge of M&A, familiar with the operating mechanisms of Wall Street; from 2002 to 2006, he served as a Special Assistant for economic policy at the White House and Executive Secretary of the National Economic Council. From 2006 to 2011, he served as a Federal Reserve Governor. During the 2008 global financial crisis, he was the chief liaison between the Federal Reserve and Wall Street and also served as a G20 representative. In 2011, he resigned in opposition to the second round of quantitative easing (QE2), believing that such large-scale bond purchases would distort the market and could lead to severe future inflation and relaxed fiscal discipline. After leaving the Federal Reserve, Wosk served as a Senior Visiting Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, and was also a partner at the Duquesne family office.

Third, in terms of his understanding of growth, Wosk belongs to the supply-side school. He believes that the U.S. economy’s performance below the potential growth rate is not due to insufficient aggregate demand, but to suppressed supply resulting from inefficient capital allocation and tighter regulation. He argues that the Federal Reserve currently underestimates the resilience of the U.S. economy in its understanding of potential growth, and also overlooks the nonlinear growth potential brought by technological change. Wosk believes the U.S. economy is going through an AI-driven productivity boom. If the annual labor productivity growth rate can rise by 1 percentage point, it could double living standards within just a generation—without bringing inflation.

Fourth, in terms of his understanding of inflation, Wosk treats inflation as the Federal Reserve’s main responsibility (Fed is chiefly responsible), not as a passive result of external shocks—i.e., inflation is a choice (inflation is a choice). He believes that during the high-inflation period of the past few years, the Federal Reserve attributing inflation to external factors is a form of shifting blame—directly negating the logic during the Powell era that 2021–2022 inflation was triggered by supply chains and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. We understand that Wosk’s framework implies the Federal Reserve will not excuse cost-push inflation; if tariffs or supply shocks push up prices, his reaction function is more likely to tighten rather than wait and see, which sharply contrasts with the “transitory inflation” narrative from the Powell era.

第五，在对利率政策的理解上，沃什历史上的公开表态整体偏鹰派，但特朗普多次表示沃什支持降息。基于沃什的学术主张和近期言论，我们倾向于认为其政策取向将支持渐进式降息。其核心逻辑在于以供给侧框架重新评估美联储政策路径，即降息不是为了平抑需求，而是为了适应供给。沃什认为，传统菲利普斯曲线所描述的失业率与通胀间的负相关关系已趋于失效，AI驱动的生产率跃升正在重塑美国经济的潜在产出边界，使得经济在维持强劲增长的同时不必然触发通胀压力，从而为维持较低利率水平提供了政策空间。这一框架与特朗普降低融资成本的政策诉求高度契合。

第六，在对货币政策和财政政策关系的理解上，沃什的立场可归纳为推动“新财政-货币协议“（New Treasury-Fed Accord）。在此前一次CNBC访谈中，沃什明确提议重构美联储与财政部的职能关系，参照1951年《财政部-美联储协议》重新划定两者的职责边界。其核心主张在于：美联储应专注于利率管理，财政部则负责政府债务与财政账户运营，两者权责须严格区隔，以防止政治因素渗透货币政策决策。在资产负债表管理层面，沃什对美联储在经济平稳时期持续扩表的做法持批评态度，将当前约7万亿美元的资产负债表规模视为多轮危机应对后遗留的非常态膨胀。基于这一判断，他主张美联储应加快缩表进程，并缩短资产组合久期，以推动货币政策正常化。

第七，在对市场沟通机制的理解上，沃什曾公开批评鲍威尔时代的沟通策略过度透明，认为高频次、高确定性的政策信号削弱了市场的自主定价功能与风险识别能力。因此，若沃什主导政策沟通改革，点阵图可能面临取消或实质性修订，联储官员的公开表态频次亦可能显著压缩。这意味着市场将重新进入政策路径高度不确定、能见度下降的环境，市场可能需在定价中纳入更高的波动率溢价，以对冲货币政策可预见性下降所带来的风险。

第八，简单来说，沃什的政策理念可能带来美联储政策框架的三个转向：一是政策分析范式从需求侧转向供给侧；二是职能定位从兼顾金融稳定与宏观调控的多重目标，回归以价格稳定为核心的货币政策本位；三是市场沟通从高透明度转向低可预见性。其核心在于，以更具弹性的利率政策配合供给侧的产能扩张释放增长动能，同时通过资产负债表管理对冲潜在通胀风险，形成宽利率、紧资产负债表的政策组合。这一框架的待验证之处有二：一是AI能够从宏观层面带来生产率的实质性提升；二是这种生产率提升背景下的利率宽松确实不会推升通胀。若上述两个结果不及预期，市场将面临期限溢价抬升与二次通胀压力的双重考验。

第九，贵金属市场在1月30日经历了大幅回撤。我们理解贵金属大跌与前期持续上涨积累过高获利盘、机构多头头寸平仓以及程序化交易（CTA）叠加影响有关；从“沃什效应”的角度来说，市场的担心可能包括：（1）沃什排斥赤字货币化，并且主张缩表。如果未来美联储显著缩表，那么可能重新有利于美元信用，美元指数提振将打破贵金属的关键支撑逻辑（信用货币贬值预期）；（2）尽管沃什认为新技术可以消灭通胀，但这毕竟是一种长叙事；对于现实的通胀问题本身他属于鹰派，市场担心一旦短期通胀失控，他可能会以坚决的紧缩路径应对。恰好1月30日公布的美国PPI数据超预期，放大了市场的担忧。

正文

2026年1月30日，特朗普宣布他将提名沃什担任下届美联储主席，接替鲍威尔，鲍威尔作为主席的任期将于 5 月届满。特朗普在声明中回顾了沃什的职业背景，并声称沃什将成为“史上最伟大的美联储主席之一”（he will go down as one of the great Fed chairmen），且“绝不会让人失望”（he will never let you down）。提名仍需参议院银行委员会听证及全体投票确认。

On January 30, Trump announced that he will nominate Kevin Wosk to serve as the next Chair of the Federal Reserve, replacing Jerome Powell (Jerome Wosk Powell). Powell’s term as Chair will end in May.

Trump has a very high opinion of Wosk, calling him an “ideal Central Casting” pick. “Central Casting” was originally the name of a casting company in the U.S., specializing in finding background actors or supporting actors that best match a role’s image. We understand that when Trump uses this term to describe Wosk, on the one hand, he wants to say Wosk has the traits recognized by Wall Street—namely sharp market instincts, strong connections, and hands-on experience handling financial crises. On the other hand, in Trump’s context, this may also mean that the person he picks would, to some extent, be willing to embrace Trump’s vision.

Wosk’s resume is extremely diverse. He has hands-on experience across Wall Street M&A, White House economic policy work, and crisis response at the Federal Reserve. He previously served as an Executive Director at Morgan Stanley from 1995 to 2002, handling M&A business and familiar with Wall Street’s operating mechanisms; from 2002 to 2006, he served as a Special Assistant for economic policy at the White House and Executive Secretary of the National Economic Council. From 2006 to 2011, he served as a Federal Reserve Governor. During the 2008 global financial crisis, he served as the chief liaison between the Federal Reserve and Wall Street and was also a G20 representative. In 2011, he resigned for opposing the second round of quantitative easing (QE2), believing that such large-scale bond purchases would distort the market and could lead to severe future inflation and relaxed fiscal discipline. After leaving the Federal Reserve, Wosk became a Senior Visiting Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, and was also a partner at the Duquesne family office.

Wosk’s resume is quite diverse. Wosk previously served as an Executive Director at Morgan Stanley from 1995 to 2002, responsible for M&A business and familiar with Wall Street’s operating mechanisms; during 2002 to 2006, he served as Special Assistant for economic policy at the White House and Executive Secretary of the National Economic Council.

From 2006 to 2011, he served as a Federal Reserve Governor, becoming the youngest Governor in history at age 35. During the 2008 global financial crisis, he served as the main liaison between the Federal Reserve and Wall Street. Wosk resigned from his Governor position in March 2011, mainly due to differences in理念 with respect to Bank’s QE2; he believed that such large-scale bond purchases would distort the market and could lead to a resurgence of inflation in the future and relaxed fiscal discipline.

In terms of professional capability, Wosk has a deep understanding of financial cycles and the underlying drivers of liquidity. In May 2008, before global markets had fully recognized that risks were coming, Wosk already pointed out, “The global financial system is facing severe undercapitalization (Significant Undercapitalization),” while many policymakers still believed the subprime crisis was localized and controllable.

In terms of hands-on experience, in September 2008—when Bear Stearns and Lehman failed and Wall Street was in a collapse of confidence—Wosk personally took part in urgent negotiations for Morgan Stanley’s transition (Morgan Stanley) into a bank holding company. This strategic shift not only secured Morgan Stanley’s permanent support from the Federal Reserve’s discount window, but also blocked the run on deposits from a market sentiment perspective.

After leaving the Federal Reserve, Wosk served as a Senior Visiting Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, and was also a partner at the Duquesne family office.

In terms of his understanding of growth, Wosk belongs to a quasi-supply-side school. He believes that the U.S. economy’s performance below the potential growth rate is not due to insufficient aggregate demand, but rather to suppressed supply caused by inefficient capital allocation and tighter regulation. He argues that the Federal Reserve currently underestimates the resilience of the U.S. economy in its understanding of potential growth, and also overlooks the nonlinear growth potential brought by technological change. Wosk believes the U.S. economy is experiencing an AI-driven productivity boom. If the annual labor productivity growth rate can increase by 1 percentage point, living standards could double within a single generation—and without causing inflation.

Warsh’s understanding of U.S. economic growth is based on the traditional supply-side school, which stands in stark contrast to the Federal Reserve’s mainstream demand-management framework in the Powell era. During his tenure as a Federal Reserve Governor, he delivered a speech titled “Rejecting the Requiem,” explicitly criticizing a policy orientation that relies solely on demand stimulus.

Policymakers should also take notice of the critical importance of the supply side of the economy． The supply side establishes its productive capacity． It is a function of the quality and quantity of labor and capital assembled by our companies． Recovery after a recession demands that capital and labor be reallocated． But， the reallocation of these resources to new sectors and companies has been painfully slow and unnecessarily interrupted。

In his view, the Federal Reserve’s policies over the past fifteen years—especially QE and prolonged low interest rates—have not only failed to unleash economic potential, but also distorted capital allocation, shifting resources from productive investment to financial speculation. As he described in his 2025 column in the Wall Street Journal, “Wall Street’s money has been far too loose, and credit to Main Street has been far too tight.” The Federal Reserve’s massive balance sheet (used to support businesses in the crisis era of the past) can be reduced substantially. In other words, he believes that loose monetary policy has not only failed to boost the real economy, but—through the blurred boundary between fiscal and monetary policy—has fueled inefficient public spending and moral hazard in the private sector.

“Money on Wall Street is too easy， and credit on Main Street is too tight． The Fed‘s bloated balance sheet， designed to support the biggest firms in a bygone crisis era， can be reduced significantly．”

In addition, Warsh believes that the bottleneck to economic growth is not insufficient stimulation of aggregate demand, but structural obstacles on the supply side—excessive regulation, capital misallocation, and the central bank’s distortion of market price signals.

Pro-growth policies also demand reform in the conduct of regulatory policy． It would provide more timely， clear， and consistent rules so that firms–financial and otherwise–could innovate in a changing economic landscape． It would allow firms to succeed or fail． It would not protect the privileged perch of incumbent firms–no matter their size or scope–at the expense of their smaller， more dynamic competitors

More notably, Warsh remains optimistic about technological change and productivity growth. He believes the Federal Reserve’s current estimates of potential growth significantly underestimate the resilience of the U.S. economy, especially ignoring the nonlinear leap in growth potential that general-purpose technologies like AI may bring. In a G30/IMF speech in April 2025, Warsh explicitly stated that productivity is the key to achieving an inflation-free boom. If we can raise the annual labor productivity growth rate by even 1 percentage point, we can double living standards within a generation—without triggering price instability.

“Productivity is the key to prosperity without inflation． If we can raise labor productivity growth by even one percentage point annually， we can double living standards in a single generation — and do so without triggering price instability．”

This view implies that if the Federal Reserve continues to understand the economy through an outdated Phillips curve framework, strong growth may automatically be equated with inflation risk, causing it to tighten policy too early and choke off the economy’s endogenous momentum stemming from the productivity boom. Warsh’s framework suggests that under an AI-driven new economic paradigm, the Federal Reserve should tolerate a higher real growth rate without having to worry about inflation, provided monetary discipline is restored and capital can flow to truly productive investment areas rather than being pushed toward speculative assets by artificially lowered interest rates.

In terms of his understanding of inflation, Wosk views inflation as the Federal Reserve’s main responsibility (Fed is chiefly responsible), rather than the passive result of external shocks—namely that inflation is a choice (inflation is a choice). He believes that during the high-inflation periods of the past few years, it is a form of shifting blame when the Federal Reserve attributes inflation to external factors—directly negating the logic during the Powell era that the inflation in 2021–2022 was caused by supply chains and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. We understand that Wosk’s framework means the Federal Reserve will not excuse cost-push inflation; if tariffs or supply shocks push prices up, his reaction function is more likely to tighten than to wait and see, which sharply contrasts with the “transitory inflation” narrative from the Powell era.

In an interview at the Hoover Institution in July 2025, Wosk said he believes what Milton Friedman said—that inflation is a choice. In the 1970s, Congress assigned the Federal Reserve the responsibility to ensure price stability in its review of regulations. The purpose was to make one institution responsible for prices, so it wouldn’t blame others anymore. He argues that when policymakers first ignore the problem and then shift responsibility elsewhere, the risk of an inflation spiral emerges. When central banks act slowly or lack determination, inflation becomes embedded in the price-setting process.

He also mentioned that from the commentary in the past few years, you wouldn’t know that inflation is a choice. In fact, during the lead-up period to the big inflation over the past five or six years, what reasons for inflation did we hear? It was Putin in Ukraine. It was the pandemic and supply chains. Hearing those explanations would enrage Milton.

“I believe what Milton Friedman and you just channeled， which is inflation is a choice．．． inflation and ensuring price stability was granted to the Federal Reserve by the Congress most recently in a review of its statutes in the 1970s． So that there would be one agency that would be responsible for prices． No more blaming the other guy． We‘re giving the baton to you， the Central Bank．”

“Now you wouldn‘t know from recent commentary of the last several years that inflation were a choice． In fact， during the run up to the great inflation last five or six years， what did we hear about the causes of inflation？ It was because of Putin in Ukraine． It was because of the pandemic and supply chains． Well， Milton would be outraged to hear that．”

We understand that Wosk’s framework means the Federal Reserve will not excuse cost-push inflation. If tariffs or supply shocks push up prices, his reaction function is more likely to tighten rather than tolerate—sharply contrasting with the transitory inflation narrative from the Powell era.

In terms of his understanding of interest-rate policy, Wosk’s public remarks historically have overall leaned hawkish, but Trump has said multiple times that Wosk supports rate cuts. Based on Wosk’s academic views and recent statements, we tend to think his policy orientation will support gradual rate cuts. The core logic is to reassess the Federal Reserve’s policy path using a supply-side framework—namely, rate cuts are not meant to smooth demand, but to adapt to supply. Wosk believes the negative correlation between unemployment and inflation described by the traditional Phillips curve has become increasingly ineffective, and the AI-driven surge in productivity is reshaping the boundary of the U.S. economy’s potential output, enabling the economy to sustain strong growth without necessarily triggering inflation pressure—thereby creating policy room to maintain lower interest rates. This framework aligns highly with Trump’s policy goal of lowering financing costs.

Wosk believes the Federal Reserve should not mechanically keep interest rates high just because economic data is strong. He argues that if growth is driven by productivity (especially AI infrastructure and applications), this growth is inherently disinflationary (Disinflationary). He criticizes the current Federal Reserve model as overly focused on demand-side pressures while ignoring supply-side expansion.

Wosk believes high wages and strong growth do not necessarily lead to inflation. As long as the pace of productivity gains is faster than the growth of the money supply and government spending, there is room for interest rates to move downward to support a long-term capital expenditure cycle.

“The dogmatic belief that inflation occurs when workers earn too much should be discarded．．． AI would boost productivity， strengthen U.S． competitiveness， and act as a disinflationary force．”

In addition, Wosk has long attacked the view that the Federal Reserve thinks high economic growth leads to inflation. He believes the misjudgment of inflation in 2021–2022 under Powell stems from their attempt to manage the economy through fine-tuning demand while ignoring structural supply shocks; printing money is the core problem.

“The Fed’s economic models wrongly assume that rapid economic growth threatens to elevate inflation． Instead， inflation is caused when government spends too much and prints too much．”。

We understand that this means the Federal Reserve under Wosk might no longer view GDP growth above 3% as an overheating signal, thereby avoiding preventive rate hikes meant to suppress growth. He also mentioned in a 2025 October interview that we can significantly reduce interest rates so that 30-year fixed-rate mortgages become affordable and the housing market can restart. The way to do that is, releasing the balance sheet and taking money out of Wall Street.

“We can lower interest rates a lot， and in so doing get 30-year fixed-rate mortgages so they‘re affordable， so we can get the housing market to get going again． And the way to do that is， as you say， to free up the balance sheet， take money out of Wall Street．”

In terms of his understanding of the relationship between monetary policy and fiscal policy, Wosk’s stance can be summarized as pushing for a “New Treasury-Fed Accord” (New Treasury-Fed Accord). In an earlier CNBC interview, Wosk clearly proposed reshaping the functional relationship between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department, and redrawing their responsibility boundaries by referencing the 1951 “Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord.” His core proposition is that the Federal Reserve should focus on interest-rate management, while the Treasury Department should handle operations related to government debt and fiscal accounts; the responsibilities and authority of both sides must be strictly separated to prevent political factors from seeping into monetary-policy decision-making. In terms of balance-sheet management, Wosk has criticized the Federal Reserve’s practice of continuing to expand its balance sheet during periods of economic stability, regarding the current balance sheet size of roughly $7 trillion as an abnormal expansion left over from multiple rounds of crisis response. Based on this judgment, he argues that the Federal Reserve should accelerate the process of balance-sheet reduction and shorten the duration of its asset portfolio to promote the normalization of monetary policy.

In the July 2025 CNBC interview, Wosk mentioned that “we need a new Treasury-Fed accord, like we did in 1951—that was after another period where we built up our nation’s debt and our central bank and Treasury were working at cross purposes. That is the state of things now. If we have a new accord, then the Fed chair and the Treasury Secretary can clearly and prudently describe to the markets: ‘this is our target for the size of the Fed’s balance sheet.’” In a May 2025 Hoover Institution interview, he said the Treasury Secretary should be responsible as the fiscal authority, not blur these responsibilities into the Federal Reserve—otherwise it would only bring politics into the Fed.

“We need a new Treasury-Fed accord， like we did in 1951 after another period where we built up our nation‘s debt and we were stuck with a central bank that was working at cross purposes with the Treasury． That’s the state of things now． So if we have a new accord， then the Fed chair and the Treasury Secretary can describe to markets plainly and with deliberation， ‘This is our objective for the size of the Fed’s balance sheet”

We understand that Wosk believes the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet should be used for emergencies, and once the crisis is over, the Federal Reserve should exit (reduce the balance sheet).

However, the current level of bank reserves has fallen from its peak, and further balance-sheet reduction faces liquidity constraints. Therefore, Wosk’s framework may include: coordinating the Treasury Department on the structure of Treasury debt issuance, adjusting the reserve requirement mechanism, or achieving a “shadow” balance-sheet reduction through other tools. The specific operational details in this area still need to be confirmed.

In terms of his understanding of market communication mechanisms, Wosk has publicly criticized the over-transparency of the communication strategy during the Powell era, arguing that high-frequency, high-certainty policy signals weaken the market’s ability for autonomous pricing and risk identification. Therefore, if Wosk leads reforms to policy communication, the dot plot could face cancellation or substantive revision, and the frequency of public statements by Fed officials could also be significantly compressed. This means the market will return to an environment where the policy path is highly uncertain and visibility declines; the market may need to incorporate a higher volatility risk premium into pricing to hedge the risks brought by reduced predictability of monetary policy.

In the August 2016 Wall Street Journal, Wosk mentioned in his article “The Federal Reserve Needs New Thinking” that in recent years the execution of monetary policy has had serious flaws, and the reform agenda needs stricter review of recent policy choices and major changes to the Fed’s tools, strategies, communications, and governance.

“The conduct of monetary policy in recent years has been deeply flawed．．． A robust reform agenda requires more rigorous review of recent policy choices and significant changes in the Fed‘s tools， strategies， communications and governance．“

In short, Wosk’s policy philosophy may bring three shifts to the Federal Reserve’s policy framework: first, the policy analysis paradigm shifts from the demand side to the supply side; second, the function positioning shifts away from multiple goals that balance financial stability and macroeconomic control, returning to the monetary-policy principle centered on price stability; third, market communication shifts from high transparency to lower predictability. The core is to form a policy combination of “wide interest rates, tight balance sheet” by pairing a more elastic interest-rate policy with supply-side capacity expansion to release growth momentum, while using balance-sheet management to hedge potential inflation risks. There are two points in this framework that remain to be validated: first, whether AI can bring a substantive improvement in productivity from the macro level; second, whether under such productivity improvement, easing interest rates indeed will not raise inflation. If the two results above fall short of expectations, the market will face a dual test: higher term premium and renewed inflationary pressure.

On the policy-framework level, Wosk’s taking office may bring three changes. First, the Fed’s analytical paradigm shifts from demand-side management to a supply-side logic, and the Fed may no longer treat GDP growth above 3% as an overheating signal. Second, the Fed’s role positioning shifts away from multiple objectives that combine financial stability and macroeconomic regulation, returning to monetary policy centered on price stability. Functions such as bank supervision, climate-risk guidelines, and the like could be handed back to the Treasury, meaning the core of the Fed’s independence is its autonomous authority to decide on the benchmark interest rate and the inflation target. Third, market communication shifts from high transparency to reducing policy predictability; the dot plot could face cancellation or substantive revision, and the market may need to include a higher volatility risk premium in pricing.

For the market, if Wosk’s supply-side logic becomes dominant in policy making, it would open up room for rate cuts while sustaining expectations for relatively high growth. However, the effectiveness of this logic depends heavily on a substantive improvement in productivity. In addition, Wosk’s long-standing critical stance toward balance-sheet expansion suggests that while guiding short-term rates lower, he may take a more aggressive balance-sheet reduction pace; the Treasury yield curve could become steeper, and long-end yields’ volatility could rise significantly. If supply-side reforms progress slower than expected, the market will face a dual test: higher term premium and renewed inflationary pressure.

Precious metals markets saw a sharp pullback on January 30. We understand that the plunge in precious metals is related to the combined impact of excessively high profit-taking positions accumulated from the prior sustained rally, institutional long positions closing out, and the overlay effect of programmed trading (CTA). From the perspective of the “Wosk effect,” market concerns may include: (1) Wosk’s opposition to deficit monetization, along with his support for balance-sheet reduction. If the Federal Reserve significantly reduces its balance sheet in the future, it could become favorable again for U.S. dollar credit, and an increase in the U.S. dollar index could break the key support logic for precious metals (expectations of credit-currency depreciation); (2) although Wosk believes new technology can eliminate inflation, after all, this is a long narrative. On the issue of real inflation itself, he is hawkish; markets worry that once short-term inflation gets out of control, he may respond with a firm tightening path. It just so happened that the U.S. PPI data released on January 30 came in above expectations, amplifying market concerns.

Risk提示：Inflation falling short of expectations or fiscal easing triggering demand overheating could force the Federal Reserve to keep high interest rates for a longer period. Uncertainty in geopolitical conditions and potential changes to tariff policies could pose a supply-side shock to supply-chain recovery. If macroeconomic data deviates from the baseline “soft landing” path, asset prices that are currently pricing in rate cuts and “soft landing” expectations may face significant valuation adjustment risk.

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