Solar energy rebounds! Jiejia Weichuang vs. Maiwei Co., Ltd., who is stronger in photovoltaic equipment?

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Ask AI · How can Jiejia Weichuang achieve growth against the tide through a platform-based strategy?

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By / Starry Sky’s Durian Honey

Edited by / Starry Sky’s Spinach

Layout by / Starry Sky’s Ume

Recently, Musk claimed that Tesla will achieve an annual solar manufacturing capacity of 100GW within three years, and also send photovoltaic panels to space. At the same time, multiple media outlets online also reported that Tesla plans to procure production equipment from China’s photovoltaic equipment companies for manufacturing solar cells. Under the scorching heatwave, the photovoltaic equipment industry’s two flagship companies— $Jiejia Weichuang (SZ300724)$ and $Maiwei Co., Ltd. (SZ300751)$—naturally attracted market attention.

Source: Global Times, Interface News, Securities Times

In the first three quarters of 2025, Jiejia Weichuang’s revenue increased slightly to 13.106 billion yuan, up 6.17%, while non-GAAP net profit surged 26.68% against the trend. Meanwhile, in the same period, Maiwei’s revenue was 6.204 billion yuan, down 20.13% year over year, and profit also fell 13.98%. This one rise and one fall reveals two completely different survival states: Jiejia is like a fully stocked, well-equipped supermarket—everything is there and it performs steadily; Maiwei is like a tech specialist polishing a single product—its technology is strong, but it is currently being chilled by the industry cycle.

I. Jiejia lays out across the whole line; Maiwei makes breakthroughs in single points

In fact, the logic of doing business for the two companies differs greatly. Jiejia takes a platform-style route. Its product line is astonishingly extensive, ranging from cleaning and fabric formation to coating and etching, and it even sells its own automated logistics systems. This “turnkey engineering” makes it like an all-purpose butler: when customers provide land, they can take away an entire production line bundled together. Looking at the revenue structure, process equipment accounts for 83.34%, automated equipment for 12.05%, and spare parts for 4.62%. This kind of big-and-complete layout allowed it to feast abundantly in the TOPCon era, and its transition to perovskite is also a full-line bet.

Source: iFinD by Eastmoney—Jiejia Weichuang (left), Maiwei Co., Ltd. (right)

Maiwei, by contrast, is an extreme focus expert. It concentrates on screen printing and the core segments of HJT heterojunction. In terms of revenue, 75.00% comes from turnkey equipment sets, 18.10% from single machines, and 6.90% from spare parts and others. This enables it to capture about 70% of global market share in the HJT field, with very high technological barriers. Its gross margin is currently as high as 35.69%, ahead of Jiejia’s 29.07% by one step. Maiwei’s strategy is to use core equipment to drive an entire line. It has fewer product categories, but its dominance in sub-segments is unmatched.

However, both companies share one thing: they are both aggressively going global. Jiejia’s overseas revenue share has climbed to 24.05%, and its gross margin is as high as 35.41%; Maiwei’s is also close to 20%, and its overseas gross margin similarly exceeds that of the domestic market. When domestic photovoltaic capacity is oversupplied and a price war is raging to the point of exhaustion, these two giants take profits overseas in unison. Jiejia relies on the breadth of its product line to match various demands; Maiwei relies on core technology to win purchases from overseas buyers.

It’s worth noting that Jiejia’s gross margin for automated equipment has continued to rise to 27.83%, and the synergy effects of full-line integration are beginning to release dividends, while Maiwei’s single-machine business grows quickly but cannot offset the downturn caused by falling sales of turnkey equipment sets.

II. Jiejia improves cost efficiency; Maiwei faces pressure from heavy R&D

On profitability quality, the gap between the two may be even bigger than their product structure differences.

During the industry downturn, Jiejia managed to achieve growth in both profits and profitability against the trend. The secret lies in scale effects and fee control. Its period expense ratio was cut from 10.14% in 2020 down to 4.47%. What it saved is “real money.” More importantly, asset impairment losses shrank sharply from 765 million yuan to 83 million yuan, indicating that inventories can be sold and downstream collections are smooth, which means the industry chain has stable pricing power. This allowed Jiejia to keep a net profit margin of 20.52% even as component prices plunged, far above the industry average.

Source: iFinD by Eastmoney—Jiejia Weichuang (up), Maiwei Co., Ltd. (down)

Maiwei was not so lucky. Behind the double decline in revenue and profit are heavy R&D burdens and deteriorating cash flow. To stay ahead, Maiwei raised its R&D expense ratio to 10.84%, which is astonishingly high for a manufacturing business. The high investment creates a technological moat, but it also drags down current-period profit, causing net profit margin to slip to 10.71%. Even more troublesome, credit impairment losses continued to rise from 357 million yuan to 435 million yuan, suggesting that downstream battery cell manufacturers are having a hard time: payments are slowing, and bad-debt risk is accumulating. High R&D costs become a heavy burden specifically during the industry downswing.

On cash flow, Jiejia’s operating cash flow for the first three quarters temporarily turned negative, mainly due to funds frozen by litigation. In previous years, it had been significantly net inflow. Maiwei’s indicator has been consistently far below net profit for two consecutive years; its current net cash outflow is as high as 1.042 billion yuan, indicating that although Maiwei is strong in technology within the industry chain, facing squeeze from both upstream and downstream, pressure on capital turnover is enormous. The upstream demands cash settlement, while the downstream delays payments—caught in the middle, Maiwei can only rely on self-funding to maintain high R&D. This tight situation is especially dangerous during the industry downswing. If financing tightens, Maiwei’s expansion pace may be forced to slow down, whereas Jiejia, backed by ample cash reserves, still has sufficient ammunition for counter-cyclical deployment.

III. Jiejia has cash as king; Maiwei plays a high-leverage game

At the level of financial structure such as assets and liabilities, the two companies are almost textbook examples of conservative versus aggressive.

Jiejia holds a huge amount of cash wealth management. Cash and cash equivalents plus trading financial assets total 32.12% of total assets. Its asset-liability ratio has fallen to 50.10%, while the current ratio and quick ratio are 1.85 and 1.21 respectively. This cash-is-king strategy leaves it with almost no pressure of debt repayment; even if the industry stalls, it can still live on interest for a long time. In addition, Jiejia’s contract liabilities have decreased from 13.107 billion yuan to 6.481 billion yuan, and order growth has slowed. But its deep underlying base is enough to help it get through winter, and even to buy at low prices and acquire businesses during the trough.

Source: Prepared by Haohai Investment Research

Maiwei chooses high-leverage operations. Its asset-liability ratio is close to 63.92%. Although much of it is contract liabilities that do not need to be repaid, its quick ratio is already approaching the 1.00 warning line. Its inventory as a proportion is as high as 31.47%, far above Jiejia’s 24.72%. This means a large amount of funds are tied up as equipment that has not yet been accepted and is stacked in the workshops. Once downstream technology routes change abruptly or customers cancel orders, these inventories instantly turn into a massive impairment burden.

Maiwei’s high turnover and high-investment model can bring explosive growth in upswings, but in downswings it becomes a huge source of risk. In addition, Maiwei’s long-term borrowings as a proportion of total assets are 19.29%, while Jiejia’s are only 1.17%. The difference in debt structure directly determines how different their ability to withstand risks is.

To clarify: although Jiejia has recently encountered funds in its accounts being frozen, this is more of an occasional event and the proportion is small. The company also stated that it does not affect normal business operations. Meanwhile, Maiwei is pursuing aggressive expansion in the semiconductor and display panel fields, trying to find a second growth curve. While such diversification attempts are worth encouraging, they also further scatter capital and resources. From the perspective of financial safety, Jiejia is undoubtedly the one wearing a padded coat, while Maiwei is the boy running through the cold wind.

Source: Jiejia Weichuang company announcement (left); Maiwei Co., Ltd. 2025 H1 report (right)

In this elimination race for photovoltaic equipment, Jiejia wins in the present thanks to its solid foundation and platform-based advantages; although Maiwei has sharper technology, its tight cash flow and aggressive strategy leave it stumbling through the deep winter. The future outlook is yet to be known, but in the short term, Jiejia may have the edge.

Note: This article does not constitute any investment advice. There are risks in the stock market; you should be cautious when entering. Without buying or selling, there would be no harm.

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