The power structure issue of veLISTA is worth deep reflection. When we talk about decentralized autonomous organizations, there is a phenomenon that is often overlooked: **concentration of voting power**.

Theoretically, the veLISTA model allows every token holder to participate in voting. But in reality? A large amount of tokens flow to a few whales and institutions. This doesn't require hacking skills; it's purely a mathematical dominance—when 70% of voting power is held by 10 major accounts, retail investors' votes are essentially meaningless.

Even more concerning is the logic behind the **bribery mechanism**. To secure favorable voting results, project teams pay bribes to major voters. How are these rewards distributed? They flow into the wallets of a few individuals or are used for buybacks to maintain the token price. Retail investors see the token price stable and feel they've made a profit, but they don't realize they have become the "liquidity providers" of this system—using their holdings to back the entire mechanism and providing a "decentralized" facade.

To put it plainly, veLISTA's governance has evolved into: major accounts profit through voting rights, while retail investors exit through liquidity of their holdings. This is not power distribution; it's **oligarchic control**. When DAO governance becomes fully financialized, it essentially turns into a committee dominated by major accounts for利益分配。

This reflects the structural problem of the ve model itself— it assumes that token holdings accurately reflect participants' governance ability and利益关系, but in reality, capital always flows toward capital. If you're not a sufficiently large whale, your tokens are more like assets held rather than governance tools.